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CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN MARYLAND
By CHARLES MCHENRY HOWARD*
CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN ENGLAND
At the time as of which we took over the principles of
Common Law and Equity from England, trusts of the char-
acter known as Charitable Trusts had long been recognized
and enforced in that country. A brief mention of the con-
dition of the law on that subject in England is necessary for
any intelligent consideration of the course of decisions in the
States of this country.
It is commonly said that charitable trusts have three
leading and distinguishing features,' viz:
1. They must be for the benefit of the public generally,
or some considerable portion of it;
2. Their beneficiaries must necessarily be indefinite;
3. Their duration is not restricted by the rule against
perpetuities.
Directing our attention for the present to the second of
these requirements, or supposed requirements (its univer-
sality as excluding all trusts for charitable purposes when
the beneficiaries at any given time may be susceptible of
precise ascertainment under the terms of the trust has been
questioned ;2 but the rule is substantially true for present
* Of the Baltimore City bar. A. B., 1891, Johns Hopkins University;
LL. B., 1893, University of Maryland School of Law; LL. D. (Hon.), St.
John's College, 1934. Member of the Faculty Council, University of Mary-
land School of Law. Member of the Council and of the Executive Com-
mittee, American Law Institute.
'Miller, Construction of Wills (1927), Sec. 162, p. 428.
211 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1093, Sec. 362. The converse
proposition that private trusts must be for definite beneficiaries has been
recently somewhat questioned. Note, Private Trusts for Indefinite Bene-ficiaries (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 1515, reprinted in Daily Record, October 19,
1936.
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purposes), it may be said that charitable trusts begin where
private trusts end or fail by reason of indefiniteness or un-
enforceability.' For instance a bequest in trust to complete
the education of a poor orphan, in whom the testator had a
purely charitable interest, would be a good private trust and
enforceable as such, and would not be a charitable trust
under both the first and second requirements above stated.
Trusts for charitable purposes having the characteristics
above noted were fully established and recognized in
England prior to the settlement of this country.
A statute for their regulation and governance, commonly
cited as the Statute of Elizabeth, had been passed4 and this
statute plays a prominent part in the subsequent history of
charitable trusts. This statute contained a long enumera-
tion of the purposes of such trusts (which has since been
treated as not exclusive, but as indicating the general nature
of such trusts), and provided special methods for inquiring
into existing abuses and diversions.
Since trusts and equitable rights generally exist only
because of their enforceability by the courts of chancery,
and since to be so enforceable there must be some one who
can sue in equity for their enforcement, a private trust for
unascertained beneficiaries would fail with a resulting trust
to the settlor. Public or charitable trusts were saved from
such failure because the Attorney General, as the repre-
sentative of the state or public, was allowed to sue in equity
to enforce them.
The English law upon the subject also included what is
called the "Cy Pres" doctrine or rule. The name is derived
from the Norman French, and may be roughly translated
as "next thing to it". Under this doctrine, if a donor
showed a general intent to devote his gift to charitable pur-
poses; and the gift failed because the specific purpose
8 Or as said by the Supreme Court "In the books it is said that the
thing given becomes a charity where the uncertainty of the recipient be-
gins", Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, 384, 15 L. Ed. 80 (1854). "A trust
is not a charitable trust if the persons who are to benefit are not of a suffi-
ciently large or indefinite class so that the community is interested in the
enforcement of the trust". American Law Institute, Restatement of Trusts
(1935), Sec. 375.
'43 Eliz. C. 4 (1601).
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directed was too indefinite to be carried out, or was other-
wise unenforceable; or if the trust while originally useful be-
came subsequently impracticable of further administration
(as in the case, for instance, of charitable foundations to
maintain hospitals for lepers in England after leprosy
ceased to exist in England), the chancery court might direct
the application of the charitable fund to some other purpose
or purposes which it might determine to be "near" (pres)
to the charitable purpose designated by the testator or
founder.
In a case sometimes referred to,5 there may be seen an
instance of this. A Hebrew testator in England bequeathed
a fund for instruction in his religion. This was held to be
invalid as contrary to the established religion, but in order
that the pious purposes of the testator might not be alto-
gether defeated, the crown directed that the fund be used
to educate foundlings in the Christian religion.
The cy pres doctrine was further complicated by a divi-
sion into the ordinary cy pres power of applying charitable
funds to other similar purposes, which was vested in the
courts of chancery; and a special or prerogative power to
divert charitable funds, vested in the crown, and exercisable
by its direction.' The case described in the preceding
paragraph is usually cited to illustrate the prerogative
power.
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
As the decisions in Maryland on the subject of charitable
trusts have been largely influenced, if not determined, by
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (espe-
cially the case of Baptist Association v. Hart next men-
tioned), it is necessary to consider those decisions before
taking up the cases in this State.
Baptist Association v. Hart,7 decided in 1819, was a case
in which a Virginia testator made a bequest to the "Baptist
Association that for ordinary meets at Philadelphia" (an
5 Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228 (1754).
6 Il Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1291, Sec. 432.
7 Trustees of Phila. Baptist Ass'n. v. Hart's Ex'r., 4 Wheat 1, 4 L. Ed.
499 (1819).
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unincorporated agency of the Baptist Church), as a per-
petual fund for the education of youths who should appear
promising for the Baptist ministry.
The bequest was held invalid. An elaborate opinion was
rendered by Chief Justice Marshall, and a similar opinion
by Mr. Justice Story is included in the report of the case,
though it was not delivered at the time of the decision.
The argument for the decision proceeds upon the two
grounds: (1) that the jurisdiction to enforce charitable
trusts in England (not clearly distinguished from the pre-
rogative right of the Crown) was dependent upon the
Statute of Elizabeth, and, (2) that this statute was not in
force in Virginia.
About twenty-five years later, the Girard Will case'
came up before the Supreme Court. Tested by the prin-
ciples of the decision in Baptist Association v. Hart, the
munificent gifts made by Mr. Girard's will to the City of
Philadelphia for the founding of Girard College and other
charitable purposes, would doubtless have been held in-
valid.' But since that prior decision, many of the old
records of the English court of chancery had been published,
and they showed beyond doubt that charitable trusts had
been generally enforced prior to the Statute of Elizabeth.
While the opinion in the Girard case, which was written
by Mr. Justice Story, who, as we have mentioned, wrote a
concurring opinion in Baptist Association v. Hart, professes
to distinguish the two cases, yet the principle of the former
case was practically overruled. As subsequently stated by
the Supreme Court, in a case arising from the District of
Columbia," the effect of the decision in the Girard case was
'Vidal et al. v. Girard's Ex'r., 2 How. 126, 11 L. Ed. 205 (1844).
'The argument of Daniel Webster for the contesting heirs is almost
entirely devoted to the contention that the provision of the will excluding
ministers of religion from teaching in the College was hostile to the Chris-
tian faith. The list of cases in which jurisdiction was exercised over char-
itable trusts before the Statute of Elizabeth, as shown by the recent pub-
lication of the Record Commissioners in England, is given In a long foot-
note to Horace Binney's argument for the executors. 2 How. 126, 155, 11
L. Ed. 205, 217. That these cases were a surprise to counsel for the heirs
is indicated by the "hastily drawn up remarks" presented by one of the
counsel for the heirs to the Court, which are included in the report of the
argument of the case. 2 How. 126, 179, 11 L. Ed. 205, 226.1 0 Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U. S. 303, 309, 24 L.
Ed. 450 (1877).
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that "the former idea" (that the jurisdiction was dependent
on the Statute of Elizabeth) "was exploded, and has since
nearly disappeared from the jurisprudence of the country.
Upon reading the statute carefully, one cannot but feel
surprised that the doubts thus indicated ever existed."
And while reaffirming Baptist Association v. Hart as the
law of Virginia, the Supreme Court said in 1879 that it be-
lieved that the contrary was then the accepted rule in all of
the States of the Union, except Virginia, Maryland and
North Carolina."
MARYLAND DECISIONS
In Maryland, the specific question of the validity of
charitable trusts for unascertained beneficiaries does not
appear to have arisen prior to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Baptist Association v. Hart. It is true that the
Statute of Elizabeth was not included among the English
Statutes designated in Chancellor Kilty's report as in force
in Maryland at the time of the Revolution. While this
selection is not necessarily exclusive, yet it has been called
by the Court of Appeals "a safe guide in exploring an other-
wise very dubious path".12 But, as we have seen, the
enforceability of charitable trusts in England was not de-
pendent on that statute.
One form of charitable trust, at least, was not uncommon
in Maryland prior to the decisions which we are about to
consider. Land for the use of an unincorporated church
or religious body was not infrequently conveyed to trustees
on specified uses for such religious association. Curiously
enough, the validity of such trusts seems to be assumed in
cases following the unqualified adoption of the earlier rule
laid down by the Supreme Court, and in which land had been
conveyed to trustees for use as a graveyard, etc., by the
members of unincorporated religious associations.' 3 Pos-
11 Kain v. Gibboney, 101 Ui. S. 362, 366. 25 L. Ed. 813, 814 (1879).
2 Dashiell et al. V. Atty. General, 5 H. & J. 392, 403, 9 Am. Dec. 572, 577
(1822).
'-' Reed, Howard et al. v. Stouffer et al., 56 Md. 236 (1881) ; Second Uni-
versalist Society v. Dugan, 65 Md. 460, 5 Ati. 415 (1886).
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sibly it might be suggested that the constitutional prohibi-
tion against the gift, sale, etc., of land "to or in trust for"
any religious sect or denomination, without the sanction of
the Legislature, except conveyance of less than five acres
for a church, burying ground, etc., was a recognition of such
otherwise indefinite and unenforceable trusts. But this
would be inconsistent with subsequent decisions, which make
no distinction between such conveyances in trust for a
church or graveyard, and other trusts for indefinite bene-
ficiaries.'
Within three years after the decision of the Supreme
Court in Baptist Association v. Hart, the same questions
were presented to the Court of Appeals in 1822, in the case
of Dashiell v. Atty. General.'" Here a testator had made
charitable provisions for the poor children of certain con-
gregations and of a certain county, which would undoubtedly
have been good charitable trusts in any jurisdiction where
the law of charitable trusts was in force and recognized. On
suit of the Attorney General for their establishment and
enforcement, it was held, as in Baptist Association v. Hart,
that the "peculiar law of charities" originated in the
Statute of Elizabeth, which was not in force in Maryland;
and that therefore a trust, though for charitable purposes,
was not enforceable unless there were beneficiaries identified
with the same certainty as in private or non-charitable
trusts, who could sue for enforcement of the trust.
The course of decisions in Maryland was uninfluenced
by the action of the Supreme Court in practically overruling
in the Girard case its own previous decision in Baptist Asso-
ciation v. Bart; and Maryland never adopted, as many other
States did, the more liberal rule of the later decision.
It also held that the charitable purpose of a trust did not
prevent such limitations from being subject to the rule
against perpetuities, and by decisions rendered while the
1' Trustees v. Jackson Square Church, 84 Md. 173, 35 Atl. 8 (1896);
Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Woodberry M. E. Church, 148 Md. 603, 129 Atl.
908 (1925) ; Mayfield v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 150 Md. 157, 132 Atl. 595
(1926).
115 Dashiell v. Atty. General, 5 H. & J. 392, 9 Am. Dec. 572 (1822) ; ibid
6 H. & J. 1 (1823).
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so-called "duration rule" of Barnum v. Barnlum'6 was the
recognized rule in this State (according to which the dura-
tion of a trust or other limited estate beyond the period of
the rule, and not merely the time within which future limita-
tions must vest, must not exceed the period permitted by the
rule), it was held that charitable trusts were also void for
this reason if created to extend beyond a life or lives in
being plus twenty-one years. 17 While the Barnum case rule
has been abandoned,18 yet these decisions are still important,
since it has been held in subsequent cases that a trust created
so as to continue beyond the limiting period of the rule, may
be void in toto, and not merely the future limitations de-
pendent on it, if the trustee has active duties to perform;
and one of these cases, it may be noted, was a case of a trust
for a charitable object.'
In a long series of cases, following Dashiell v. Atty.
General, trusts which would be good in any jurisdiction
recognizing charitable trusts, have been held void as being
for indefinite beneficiaries, or as violating the rule against
perpetuities."
Bearing in mind that the distinguishing feature of a
charitable trust is that it is one for indefinite beneficiaries,
who are not so identified or determined that any of those
comprising the class to be benefited can sue to enforce their
rights, the effect of these decisions might be said to be to
establish that there are no charitable trusts in Maryland,
and any discussion of our subject might be as brief as the
often quoted chapter concerning snakes in the often quoted
16 Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119, 169, 90 Am. Dec. 88 (1866) ; 31 Md.
425 (1869) ; 33 Md. 283 (1870) ; 42 Md. 251 (1875) ; 51 Md. 440 (1879).
11 Cases are collected in Miller, Construction of Wills (1927), Sec. 327.
Gambrill v. Gambrill, 122 Md. 563, 89 Atl. 1094 (1914).
'
9 Amer. Colonization Soc. v. Soulsby, 129 Md. 605, 99 Ati. 944 (1916);
Ortman v. Dugan, 130 Md. 121, 100 Atl. 82 (1917). But apparently the
decision and subsequent appeals in the American Colonization Society case
supra indicated that such a "perpetuity trust" will become good by adverse
possession; 129 Md. 605, 99 Atil. 944 (1916) ; 131 Md. 296, 101 Ati. 780
(1917) ; 132 Md. 524, 104 Atl. 120 (1918) ; 134 Md. 406, 106 Atl. 858 (1919).
And cf. Turner v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 148 Md. 371, 129 Atl. 294
(1925); Hawkins v. Ghent, 154 Md. 261, 140 Atl. 212 (1928), and Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sheehan, 169 Md. 93, 179 Atl. 536 (1935) ; though
we are here concerned only incidentally with the Maryland cases on the
application of the rule against perpetuities to trusts.
20 These cases are collected and quoted in Miller, Construction of Wills
(1927) Sees. 162, 327.
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history of Iceland. But, even apart from statutory changes,
the subject may not be disposed of by so summary a state-
ment, and, in the case of gifts to charitable corporations for
special purposes, one class of what may well be called char-
itable trusts has become well established.
That a testamentary gift to or in trust for an unincor-
porated religious or other charitable association is void or
ineffective, was well settled under the long line of cases
refusing to recognize charitable trusts. Whether a con-
summated gift inter vivos to such an association was
similarly invalid, was not raised or decided until 1911.21
In the case in which this question was decided a donor
had in his lifetime given shares of stock in a Maryland
corporation to an unincorporated branch of a missionary
society, expressed to be in trust for an unincorporated
auxiliary of the unincorporated branch; and the gift had
been consummated by delivery of the stock certificate and
transfer of the shares into the name of the treasurer of the
unincorporated society, designated as such treasurer. After
the death of the donor, the shares were claimed on behalf
of his estate.
Three judges of the Court of Appeals, dissenting, held
that no logical distinction could be drawn between such a
case and the long line of cases in which similar testamentary
dispositions, or even conveyances of real estate made during
the grantor's lifetime in trust for unincorporated associa-
tions, had been held invalid. The majority of the Court,
however, held that a gift inter vivos, consummated by actual
delivery, or transfer of corporate shares, stood upon a
different basis, and was not invalid or the subject of a
resulting trust to the donor or his estate.
While the conclusion did present some logical difficulties,
yet the contrary conclusion would have meant that whenever
the plate is passed in an unincorporated church, the pastor
or church official holds the proceeds upon a resulting trust
for the contributors, suum cuique reddere; at least if
demanded.
21 Snowden v. Crown Cork, etc., Co., 114 Md. 650, 80 Ati. 510, Ann. Cas.
1912-A, 679 (1911).
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The decision was affirmed in a subsequent case, a year
later.22
GIFTS TO CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS, FOR SPECIAL USES
A long line of decisions in Maryland has established the
rule that testamentary gifts to a corporation to be applied to
specified purposes which are within the scope of the
charitable purposes which the corporation was formed to
promote, are not invalid either as trusts for indefinite
beneficiaries or as perpetuities.
A decision of the Supreme Court which antedated any of
these Maryland decisions had at least an indirect influence
on them, so that the consideration of this part of our subject,
like that of charitable trusts in general, may also begin with
a Supreme Court case.
John McDonogh, a native of Baltimore but a resident of
Louisiana, who died in 1850, left a large fortune in equal
shares to the Cities of New Orleans and Baltimore, with
elaborate provisions and directions as to the administration
and application of the funds and income. With the share
left to Baltimore, McDonogh Institute was founded in ac-
cordance with the directions of the will, and has been
operated by a board of Trustees, who were not separately
incorporated until a few years ago.23
The gifts so made were contested, and the case went up
to the Supreme Court from the Federal Court in Louisiana,
which had held the gifts invalid. The Supreme Court held
them good, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Campbell.24
The greater part of the opinion deals with the question of
the validity of the dispositions under the peculiar law of
Louisiana; but the question of the validity of the provisions
for the creation of McDonogh Institute under Maryland
Law is also considered.
The Maryland Legislature, a few years before Mc-
Donogh's death, had passed an amendment to the charter of
"' Book Depository v. Trustees, 117 Md. 86, 95, 83 AUt. 50, 54 (1912).
"Acts 1929, Ch. 563.
"Mr. Justice Campbell was appointed from Louisiana.
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the City of Baltimore, expressly authorizing it to receive
and hold gifts in trust for educational and charitable
purposes.25
All that the opinion says upon the validity of the trust
in Baltimore, is as follows:
"The question remains to be considered, whether
the destination of the legacy to public uses in the City
of Baltimore affects the valid operation of the bequest.
All the property of a corporation like Baltimore is held
for public uses, and when the capacity is conferred or
acknowledged to it to hold property, its destination to
a public use is necessarily implied. Nor can we per-
ceive why a designation of the particular use, if within
the general objects of the corporation, can affect the
result; nor is there anything in the nature of the uses
declared in this will which can withdraw from the
legacy a legal protection."26
This case is principally important, for present purposes,
because of its connection with the Barnum case, decided by
the Court of Appeals twenty years later; and sometimes
cited as the first Maryland case in which the validity of gifts
for special corporate uses was recognized. Prior to that
case, however, there was an earlier case which has been
often cited to the same effect. The case was one of a
bequest of $500 to a vestry (Protestant Episcopal vestries
are corporations under the old Vestry Act27). The bequest
was to-be invested by the Vestry and the annual interest
devoted to the support of the minister. The only question
that seems to have been urged or considered, however, seems
to have been that of whether the assent of the Legislature
had been properly obtained, under the clause in the Mary-
land Bill of Rights requiring such consent to bequests for
religious purposes. The gift was held valid. 8
At the time of the death of the testator in the Barnum
case, the City of Baltimore had already received, under the
decision of the Supreme Court in the McDonogh case, the
21 Acts 1842, Ch. 86, now part of Sec. 2 of the Charter of Baltimore.
26 McDonogh's Ex'r. et al. v. Murdoch et al., 15 How. 367, 413, 14 L.
Ed. 732, 752 (1853).
27 Bartlett v. Hipkins, 76 Md. 5, 23 Atl. 1089, 24 Atl. 532 (1892).
2' England, Ex'r. v. Vestry of Prince George's Parish, 53 Md. 466 (1879).
114
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property left it under McDonogh's will, and was operating,
through a Board of "Trustees of the McDonogh Educational
Fund and Institute", the school for which the McDonogh
will had provided. Mr. Barnum left his residuary estate
to the City of Baltimore "in trust for the McDonogh Edu-
cational Fund and Institute" to be applied to establishing a
chair in said school, to be called the Zenus Barnum Chair
for the practical application of the Mechanic Arts, with
additional provisions as to the application of his bequest.
In answer to the objection that the Board of Trustees of
the McDonogh fund was not an incorporated body and that
therefore the beneficiaries of the trust were uncertain and
undefined, and could not be legally identified, the Court said
that the municipal corporation, taking the fund in trust,
takes it for the benefit of its citizens or the public to be
applied according to the terms of the trust; and that it was
therefore in a certain sense cestui que trust as well as Trus-
tee, and that the property acquired, though in trust, being
for a public use, the corporation was liable for the execution
of the trust by and through the agencies which it might have
created for the purpose. It was further said that if the
bequest instead of being to the City in trust for an educa-
tional purpose had been to the City in trust to establish or
maintain a house of correction, or a hospital there would be
no doubt of the validity of such trust, and that the objects
would be sufficiently defined, notwithstanding the trustees
or managers of such institutions appointed by the City had
never been incorporated by law.
And in answer to the argument that there was no power
or jurisdiction by which the trust could be enforced and
that if the property were once turned over there was no
power that could prevent the corporation from using the
property for other corporate purposes, the opinion said
that if such proposition was maintainable no further argu-
ment against the validity of the trust would be necessary;
but that no principle was better settled than that where
property is held by a municipal corporation, in trust, or
where the trust reposed in the corporation is for a charity
within the scope of its duties, that then a Court of Chancery
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would prevent a misapplication of the trust fund, and
compel the execution of the trust."
Prior to the decision in the Barnum Will case,8° though
after that in England v. Prince George's Parish8 the Court
of Appeals had held two corporate bequests invalid under
the rule of Dashiell v. Atty. General,2 in a decision contain-
ing statements which can hardly be reconciled with the sub-
sequent cases upholding gifts to charitable corporations for
special uses. In Church Extension v. Smith8 a bequest to
an incorporated agency of the Methodist Episcopal Church,
"to be used as a part of the Perpetual Loan Fund of said
Society", and loaned out to necessitous churches, and a
bequest to an incorporated church "for the benefit of the
Ladies' Mite Society" of said church, were held invalid as
trusts for an indefinite class of "necessitous churches" and
for an unincorporated "Mite Society", an agency of the
church in question.
But in Crisp v. Crisp,4 a bequest to an incorporated
Presbyterian Church, part to be used in building a branch
church, and the balance to be used "for the promotion of the
worship of God according to the forms and ceremonies of
the Presbyterian Church and for no other use whatsoever",
was sustained; and in Eutaw Place Church v. Shively," the
principle which we are considering was clearly enunciated.
The bequest there was one to an incorporated church, "the
income, interest or proceeds thereof to be applied to the
Sunday School belonging to or attached to said Church."
Sunday Schools, like "Mite Societies", are not of great
antiquity, and they had not been in use for a hundred years
at the time of this decision. It was held, however, that
while the Sunday School was not itself incorporated, yet, its
relation to the incorporated church was one of entire de-
pendence and control, and that it was an "integral part"
29 Barnum et al v. Mayor, etc., Baltimore, et al., 62 Md. 275, 291, 297,
(1884).
80 Supra, note 16.
e1 Supra, note 28.
82 Supra, note 15.
"Church Extension of M. E. Church v. Smith, 56 Md. 362 (1881).
"Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422, 427, 5 Atl. 421 (1880).
" Eutaw Place Baptist Church v. Shively et al., 67 Md. 493, 10 Atl. 244,
I Amer. St. Rep. 412 (1887).
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of the church organization, and therefore embraced within
the scope of the corporate functions and work of the Church;
and that the purposes of the bequest were sufficiently certain
and capable of being enforced; so that the bequest was valid.
The subsequent cases in which this same principle has
been applied are too numerous for statement and explana-
tion in this text. As, however, the massiveness of the body
of decisions can only be appreciated by some conspectus of
them, we are adding most of them in a note,"6 with a brief
statement of the terms of the special uses declared in each.
11 Gift to an incorporated academy "not to be appropriated to any build-
ing or improvement on the academy lot, but to constitute a perpetual fund
for education". An attempted application of part of the fund to build was
enjoined at the suit of a dissenting trustee or director.
Peter v. Carter et al, Trustees, 70 Md. 139, 16 Atl. 450 (1889).
Gift to Convention of P. E. Church (incorporated) of certain land, with
buildings, furniture, etc., "to be held as a place for a church school for
boys, to be under the control and supervision of said corporation and to
be called Warfield College" in memory of testatrix's brother. Another
gift of $5,000 to the same corporation, "as an endowment to the above
named Warfield College".
Also legacy of $6,000 to the vestry of Holy Trinity Church (incorpo-
rated) for the support of the rector and for the repair of the church.
"Here, then, is a devise of land to a body corporate, capable of taking
and holding the same. And the object for which the land and legacies are
given, is declared to be for the purpose of founding and supporting a church
school for boys, to be called 'Warfield College'. The object and purpose of
the trust are definite and certain, and such as a Court of Chancery has
full power to enforce. And this being so, we are of opinion that the devise
... and the several bequests ... are valid devises and bequests."
Halsey et al. v. Convention of Prot. Epis. Church et al., 75 Md.
275, 282, 23 AU. 781, 782 (1892).
Bequest to an incorporated missionary society which had two branches
of work, domestic and foreign, to be applied to domestic missions only.
Decision by District Judge Morris in U. S. Circuit Court, Dom. &
For. Miss. Soc. P. U. Church v. Gaither, 62 Fed. 422 (1894).
Devise to Vestry of a parish, "to be applied to the maintenance of the
parish school connected with said church." "What we have said in Eutaw
Pl. Baptist Church v. Shively, et al., 67 Md. 494, and in Halsey, et al. v. The
Convention of the Prot. Epis'1 Church-, et al., 75 Md. 275, would seem to be
conclusive as to the validity of the bequest to the vestry." After discussing
these eases, and the uses expressed in the case before it, the Court pro-
ceeds: "It is obvious, therefore, there can be no foundation in fact for
the contention that the testator directed the vestry to execute a trust not
germane to the object for which it was incorporated".
Hanson et al. v. Little Sisters of the Poor, et al., 79 Md. 434, 436,
438, 32 At. 1052, 1053, 32 L. R. A. 293, 296 (1894).
Bequest to incorporated church, to be invested in safe securities and the
annual income applied to the support of the pastor of said church; and
another bequest to the Trustees of Randolph-Macon College (a corporation)
to be applied to aid deserving and promising young women by loans or free
scholarships, and another bequest to the same Institution for the education
of one or more worthy girls. These bequests were held valid. Other be-
quests for purposes not sufficiently within the scope of the corporate pur-
poses, were held invalid.
Trinity M. E. Church v. Baker, 91 Md. 539, 566, 575, 46 AUt. 1020
(1900).
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Some comment on the nature of this exception to the rule
of the unenforceability of charitable trusts in Maryland (if
indeed these gifts for corporate purposes can be called
charitable trusts) is necessary.
Gift of residue to be held in trust by the Board of Managers of the For-
eign Missionary Society of the M. E. Church (held to mean the Woman's
Foreign Missionary Society, a corporation), for the following purposes,...
that sufficient be used to educate as Bible readers in India six girls. ...
the money remaining after that set aside for the education of the afore-
said Bible readers to be applied to the purchase of a building to be used
for the education of girls in India, to be called the M. A. S. Home".
Woman's For. Miss. Soc. v. Mitchell, 93 Md. 199, 205, 207, 48
Ati. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711 (1901).
Gift of residue of estate to Trustees of Monthly Meeting of Friends (a
corporation), "in trust to invest and hold the same, etc., and apply the in-
come thereof for the use of the school under the charge and conduct of
the said Monthly Meeting".
Erhardt v. Balto. Monthly Meeting, 93 Md. 669, 679, 49 Ati. 561
(1901).
Devise of land to Vestry "to be used for such charitable purposes as
the Rector should direct". Held not to create a trust void for uncertainty.
Must be cestuis que trustent to make a trust, etc.
Doan v. Ascension Parish, 103 Md. 662, 64 Atl. 314, 115 Amer.
St. Rep. 379 (1906).
Gifts over in remainder to the Church Home and Infirmary of $5,000
"to endow a bed according to the custom and purpose of that institution,"
and to two missionary societies, to be applied to the purposes of their or-
ganization.
Ege v. Hering, 108 Md. 391, 70 Atl. 221 (1908).
Bequest of one-half of fund to Church Home and Infirmary "to be kept
as a separate fund in remembrance of my wife and daughter, and the in-
come thereof used in maintaining aged and infirm persons in said home
or in maintaining free beds in their infirmary, in the discretion of the
legatee" and bequest of other one-half to Emmanuel Church Home "to
be kept as a separate fund, to be called the 'A. M. P. Fund', and the in-
come thereof used under their rules and in the discretion of said legatee
in assisting or maintaining poor respectable sewing girls or apprentices,
unable to pay over two dollars a week for their board, or unable to pay
anything."
Baltzell v. Church Home, 110 Md. 244, 73 Atl. 151 (1909).
A devise of real estate to the Trustees of St. Patrick's School (incorpo-
rated), for the purpose of establishing a regular free school for boys and
girls and for no other object was held valid, but two devises to other cor-
porations with a prohibition of sale held to be invalid as violating the
rule against perpetuities.
Novak v. Orphans' Home Etc., 123 Md. 161, 90 Atl. 997, Ann.
Cas. 1915-C, 1067 (1914).
The next case was one of a devise in trust with a direction that a cor-
poration be formed as authorized in the statute which we are considering
further on. The purpose was to provide a home for white orphan chil-
dren of Washington County. The Court seems to have considered the case
from the same standpoint as that of a gift to an existing corporation,
and held that no "trust" was intended; the Court saying that in order that
it might be a trust it would be necessary to suppose that the testator in-
tended that every white orphan child in Washington County should have
the right of admission.
Gray v. Orphans' Home, 128 Md. 592, 98 Ati. 202 (1916).
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In the first place it is a mistake to suppose that the prin-
ciple established by these authorities is that such gifts to
charitable corporations are valid because the corporation
takes the gift for its general corporate purposes and can use
it, within those limits, as it sees fit; or that the directions
Gift to an incorporated church, in trust to apply net annual income to
support of minister. Held no trust, but a gift to a corporation on condi-
tion that it be applied to the particular use.
Conner v. Trinity Reformed Church, 129 Md. 360, 99 AtI. 547
(1916).
Bequest of residuary estate to a religious college, to be used for the
erection of a new church. Held no trust but a gift to be applied to a use
within the corporate powers of the college.
Mt. St. Mary's College v. Williams, 132 Md. 184, 103 Atl. 479
(1918).
So, too, in the case of a devise to be used as a parsonage with authority
to 8e11 and spend the money on a pipe organ, and a bequest, the interest
on which was to go towards keeping the church cemetery in repair, and
another bequest to be put out on interest and the interest therefrom to
be paid annually to the Board of Foreign Missions, the latter being recog-
nized as one of the religious interests which the church was organized to
promote.
Board of Foreign Missions v. Shoemaker, 133 Md. 594, 106 Atl.
748 (1919).
Devise and bequest to the Convention of the P. E. Church (incorpo-
rated) for the use of the Trustees of the Hannah Moore Academy and
the establishment of a memorial therein. Held valid as the Academy was
one of the many agencies of the Convention.
Mather v. Knight, 143 Md. 612, 123 AtI. 109 (1923).
Deed to the same Convention of the P. E. Church, for use as a place
of worship by a particular named congregation.
Rydzewski v. Grace Etc., Church, 145 Md. 531, 125 Atl. 717
(1924).
Gift of residuary estate to the Order of the Holy Cross (a New York
religious and charitable corporation) as a memorial to the testator's son,
and to be used by them for such educational and charitable purposes as
they may deem proper under the direction of the Bishop of Maryland.
Waters v. Order of the Holy Cross, 155 Md. 146, 142 AtI. 297
(1928).
Appointment by will under a power contained in the will of a resident
of Maryland appointing the property to a New York educational corpora-
tion, in trust to create a fund in menmry of his father, and to apply the
income therefrom to the education of deserving and talented art students
by study abroad, with provisions authorizing the investment and reinvest-
ment of the fund, excusing the "Trustee" from giving bond, etc. This case
was brought in the Federal Court and the opinion of Judge Soper goes
quite fully into the history of the subject; the Circuit Court of Appeals
adopting his opinion on that part of the case.
Art Students' League of N. Y. v. Hinkley, 31 Fed. (2d) 469
(1929). Affirmed (C. C. A. 4th) 37 Fed. (2d) 225 (1930).
Certiorari denied, 281 U. S. 733.
Two bequests, one to the Home for Incurables for Men and the other
to the Home for Incurables for Women. There was only one corporation
called the Home for Incurables, which was receiving only women; and it
was held that it took both bequests.
Another bequest to the invalid fund for disabled ministers in the care
of the Trustees of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church was
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as to the use to which the gift is to be applied are considered
as merely precatory and not enforceable.
On the contrary it has been frequently said that the
application of the fund to the designated purpose is en-
forceable. The Court of Appeals has said that they are
"capable of being enforced";87 that "no principle is now
better settled than that . . . where the trust reposed in the
corporation is for a charity within the scope of its duties, a
Court of Chancery will prevent the misapplication of the
trust funds, and compel the execution of the trust""; "for
we may concede that there is a trust"" and "this direction
of his can certainly be enforced by a Court of Equity"40 that
"the object and purpose of the trust are definite and certain,
and such as the Court of Chancery has full power to en-
force" 4 '; that "a Court of Chancery has the same power to
enforce such a trust for a charitable or religious purpose, as
it has to enforce a trust for any other purpose";42 and that
"here, then, is a corporation capable of taking, and the
object and purpose of the bequest and devise are definite
and certain, and can be enforced by a Court' .
And in one case at least it was conclusively shown that
such purposes are enforceable by the Court's enjoining an
held to be valid as a gift to such Trustees, who were incorporated, for a
specific corporate purpose.
Home for Incurables v. Bruff, 160 Md. 156, 153 Atl. 403 (1931).
Devise of land to the City of Baltimore, its authorities to use it for any
outstanding purpose for which they may deem it best suited-humanitarian
or artistic. Held that as humanitarian purposes were within the corpo-
rate purposes of the City the devise was valid.
Van Reuth v. Baltimore, 165 Md. 651, 170 Atl. 199 (1934).
Gift to a charitable corporation "in trust", to invest and reinvest and
accumulate till a certain amount was reached, and then to continue to
hold such fund in trust and use the income therefrom in such manner as
the officers and directors shall deem proper. Held valid.
Brandt, Inc. v. Y. W. C. A., 169 Md. 607, 182 Atl. 452 (1936).
17 Eutaw Place Baptist Church v. Shively et al., 67 Md. 493, 497, 10 Atl.
244, 246, I Amer. St. Rep. 412, 415 (1887).
88 Barnum et al. v. Mayor, Etc., Baltimore et al., 62 Md. 275, 299 (1884).
89 Crisp v. Crisp, 65 Md. 422, 426, 5 Atl. 421, 422 (1880).
4 0 Ibid, 65 Md. 427, 5 Atl. 423.
21 Halsey et al. v. Convention of Prot. Epis. Church, et al., 75 Md. 275, 282,
23 Atl. 781, 782 (1892).
2 Hanson et al. v. Little Sisters of the Poor, et al., 79 Md. 434, 438, 32
Atl. 1052, 1053, 32 L. R. A. 293, 297, (1894).
Is Erhardt v. Balto. Monthly Meeting, 93 Md. 669, 682, 49 At. 561, 563
(1901).
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attempted misapplication of such a fund to other corporate
purposes, at the suit of a minority trustee or director."'
Whether such gifts to a charitable corporation to be
applied to a purpose within the scope of its corporate work,
can properly be called "trusts", is perhaps a mere matter
of nomenclature. It is true that there are no decisions in
which such uses or purposes have been enforced by suit of
the Attorney General; whose right to sue in such cases
would probably be regarded as dependent on the Statute of
Elizabeth. That they are enforceable, we have already
seen; and it may be noted that in the earlier cases on this
subject the Court of Appeals did not hesitate to call them
"trusts" over and over again, and say that they were
enforceable as such. In many of the cases, also, the testator
not only used the word "trust" but gave directions as to
collection and disbursement of income, powers of the
"Trustee" and other details specially appropriate to the
creation of trusts.
In later cases, the Court has avoided the use of the word
"trust", in connection with such limitations; or has fre-
quently said that in the case before it that no "trust" was
created; with the implication that if it were a "trust" then
it would be invalid, or as stated in one of these cases, " and
since several times quoted or repeated, that such gifts for
corporate uses are valid "unless the intention to create a
trust be clear". But having in mind the number of earlier
cases in which the court itself called the disposition a
"trust", and the cases in which the testator not only used
the word "trust" but expressed his gift with many of the
incidents appropriate to "trusts", it would seem that as
long as the designated uses are within the scope of the
corporation (or possibly, if much importance is to be at-
tached to the adjective used in the Sunday School case,4 '
form an "integral" part of the corporation's work), it will
be held that no "trust" has been created. In this connection
the statement in one of the cases cited above in which the
"Peter v. Carter, et al., Trustees, 70 Md. 139, 16 Atl. 450 (1889).
"Baltzell v. Church Home, 110 Md. 244, 270, 73 Atl. 151, 156 (1909).
,Supra, note 37.
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purpose of the bequest was to provide for a home and
manual training for white orphan children of Washington
County,47 that in order to find that the testator intended to
create a "trust" for such beneficiaries it would be necessary
to find that he intended that every white orphan child in the
county should have a right of admission to the Home, may
throw some light on what is meant by "unless the intention
to create a trust be clear".
Nor perhaps can it be said that the test is merely whether
the purpose stated is ultra vires. If this were so, since
trust companies are authorized generally to accept and
execute trusts of every nature and description,48 it might
follow that bequests for charitable purposes would be valid
when made to a trust company as trustee although invalid
if similarly made to individual trustees; a position which
is hardly maintainable.
LEGISLATION IN MARYLAND
In 1888 the Legislature passed a statute49 that no devise
or bequest for charitable uses shall be held void for uncer-
tainty of beneficiaries, provided the will contains directions
for the formation of a corporation to take the same, and
such corporation is formed within twelve months after
probate of the will or termination of any previous life
estates.
Referring to this statute, a textwriter has said that "the
relief afforded by the Maryland Legislature has been
extraordinarily meager".5 It has however been availed
of to a considerable extent by testators of large means,
having a considerable fund which they desired to devote to
establishing a charity. It does not supply so well the need
of the testator of limited means, who would not consider the
formation of a corporation to carry out his charitable in-
tentions. Perhaps it might be said that such testators have
'7 Gray v. Orphans' Home, 128 Md. 592, 98 Ati. 202 (1916).
,8Md. Code, Art. 11, Sec. 46, Part Eighth.
,9 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 337.
50 Zollman on Charities, Sec. 43. It may be noted that charitable be-
quests have never been exempted from inheritance tax in Maryland; ex-
cept, since 1924, bequests to any county or city in the State; Md. Code
Supp., Art. 81, See. 105.
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sufficient choice in being able to leave their gift to any
existing charitable corporation for its general purposes,
or for some special purpose within their scope.
In 1906 the Legislature added two sections to the Code,"'
intended to validate the device, conveyance, etc., of burial
lots, and bequests of sums not exceeding $5,000, in trust
for the perpetual care and maintenance of such lots and
funeral vaults, tombs, etc.
It should be noted that this statute merely says that such
trusts, etc., "shall not be held void as offending against the
rule against perpetuities"; and says nothing about the other
objection to such dispositions, that they are not for bene-
ficiaries who could sue to enforce the trust. Possibly the
heirs and assigns of the testator may be held to be such
beneficiaries.
Since such trusts for graves, etc., have been generally
held not to be charitable trusts," this statute is only indi-
rectly related to our subject matter.
In 1908 a section was added to the Code,5" that the rule
against perpetuities should not apply to any contingent
limitation over from a charitable corporation on a future
event; which in most cases would mean a limitation over for
failure to observe the conditions or terms of the charitable
gift to such corporation. It is directed to validating such
future limitations over, rather than to any supposed per-
petuity in the duration of the "trust" or original gift.
This brings us up to a few years ago, when the statute
next mentioned, was passed. It left testators with two prin-
cipal means of making charitable bequests, viz, either to
leave the gift to an existing charitable corporation, or to
direct the formation of a special charitable corporation to
receive and administer their gift.
In 1931, however, a statute was enacted, having for its
apparent purpose the full recognition of charitable trusts
in Maryland, or it might be said, the adoption of the prin-
ciple of the Girard Will case rather than that of Baptist
51 Md. Code, Art. 93, Secs. 327, 338.
"American Law Institute, Restatement of Trusts, Sees. 124-d, 374-b.
" Md. Code, Art. W, Sec. 330.
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Association v. Hart and Dashiell v. Atty. General. Its full
text is as follows :54
"Courts of Equity within this State shall have full
jurisdiction to enforce trusts for charitable purposes,
upon suit of the State by the Attorney General or upon
the suit of any person or persons having an interest in
the enforcement thereof; and as to all trusts hereafter
created for charitable purposes, whether by gift, deed,
will or other form of settlement, and whether the sub-
ject thereof be real or personal property, it shall be no
objection to the validity or enforceability of such trusts
or of such gift, deed, bequest, devise, etc., that the bene-
ficiaries of such trust, constitute an indefinite class or
that such trusts or the limitations under such settlement
are limited to extend for a perpetual or indefinite
period. 'Charitable purposes' under this section shall
include all such purposes as are within either the spirit
or letter of the Statute of 43 Elizabeth Ch. 4 (1601),
commonly known as the statute of charitable uses."
The statute approaches the subject from the standpoint
of the grounds upon which charitable trusts have been held
to be invalid in Maryland. By vesting a right to sue for
their enforcement in the Attorney General, it removes the
objection that there must be a resulting trust if no one,
because of uncertainty of beneficiaries, can sue for their
enforcement. It also removes any such objection as would
otherwise lie against them as perpetuities, if unlimited in
duration. And while not enacting the provisions of the
Statute of Elizabeth, it adopts the enumeration of charitable
objects therein contained, as the English courts had done,
and courts in this country, as illustrative of the general
classes of purposes which are the objects of charitable
trusts.
Its validating provisions apply, in terms, only to char-
itable trusts created subsequent to its passage. Although it
has been on the statute books for nearly six years, it is some-
what surprising that it has not yet been passed upon or
construed in any way by the Court of Appeals. It has been
"
4Md. Code Supp., Art. 16, Sec. 268-A.
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cited in one case," but merely to say that the case was de-
cided without reference to this statute, as the disposition in
question was clearly valid without the aid of the statute.
Assuming that the statute has accomplished its professed
purpose of making charitable trusts enforceable and valid,
a further question of considerable importance remains, i. e.,
does the statute establish the cy pres doctrine, power or
jurisdiction in Maryland, and do courts of equity here now
have the power to direct the application of charitable funds
to cognate purposes, when the designated purposes are
either impracticable at the beginning or become so in course
of time?
Professor Bogert, in his recent monumental work on
Trusts, already several times cited, says that the Maryland
statute seems broad enough to give the courts cy pres
power. 6 Doubtless he bases his conclusion on the fact that
the statute confers upon the equity courts full power to
enforce charitable uses, and the fact that the cy pres power
has been accepted by most of the States in this country
which have adopted the English law of charitable trusts, as
part of the system and jurisdiction so inherited.57
Having in mind the particular background upon which
the statute was passed, and the previous history of char-
itable trusts in Maryland, which we have traced, it is sub-
mitted that it is improbable that it will be held that the
statute confers cy pres powers upon the Maryland courts.
Full power to enforce charitable trusts and uses does not
necessarily include or imply a power to divert the subject
matter to other uses, even though conceived of as done to
carry out some general charitable intent which the court
finds or professes to find in the will. And as said by Pro-
fessor Bogert," the cy pres power is "admittedly an un-
usual doctrine"; and if it had been the intention of the
55 Board of Home Missions v. Lynch, 168 Md. 117, 176 Atl. 619 (1934).
It is also cited in the case of Second National Bank v. Second National
Bank, Daily Record, February 23, 1937 (Md. 1937) which was decided
while this article was being printed.
56 II Bogert on Trusts and Trustees (1935), Sec. 433, p. 1298.
57 American Law Institute, Restatement of Trusts, Secs. 399 et seq., p.
1208.
68 II Bogert on Trusts and Trustees (1935), Sec. 431, p. 1288.
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legislature to introduce it, it would seem that such intention
would have been made clear by express terms.
At the same session of the Legislature, however, another
statute was passed which does in terms introduce the cy pres
doctrine in part, at least. 9 It reads as follows:
"Whenever any charitable or religious corporation
is dissolved or about to be dissolved, or for any reason
it is impracticable or inexpedient to continue the corpo-
ration activities, and all or any part of the corporate
property is not needed for the payment of the corporate
debts, a court of equity shall have power to determine
by its decree the disposition of said property; and, in
such case, in so far as any donors of property to the
corporation, or their successors in interest, may not
be entitled to such property as a result of the cessation
of the corporate activities, or may fail to assert any
claim thereto, after having received notice of the sub-
stance and object of the bill or petition either by per-
sonal summons or by such publication as the court shall
direct, the court shall, so far as possible, direct or pro-
vide for the transfer of such property to any other
corporation or association of this or another State,
having a similar or analogous character or purpose, or
in some way associated or connected with the corpora-
tion to which the property has previously belonged, the
intent of this act being that courts of equity may in such
cases exercise the judicial power of cy pres, in order to
carry out, in spite of the change of circumstances, the
general purpose of the donor or donors of the property
as regards the application and utilization of the gift
or gifts."
This statute is, however, in terms confined to cases of
charitable or religious corporations which are about to be
dissolved, or whose activities are for any reason not to be
continued; and the express granting of cy pres powers to
courts of equity is limited by the words "in such case". It
would seem therefore that it does not apply to charitable
trusts in general; at least not to charitable trusts when a
charitable corporation does not hold or own the property.
Whether it applies to those charitable trusts (which it
would seem are not to be called trusts) which have been held
51 Acts 1931, Ch. 291; Md. Code Supp, Art. 16, Sec. 116-A.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to arise, as we have seen, when a gift is made to a charitable
corporation with binding instructions that it be held and
applied to some purpose or purposes which are within the
scope of its corporate purposes, remains to be decided; as
the statute apparently has not yet been before the Court of
Appeals. It may be noted that it limits its provisions by
the qualification "in so far as any donors . . . may not be
entitled to such property as a result of the cessation of the
corporate activities". Some such qualification was, of
course, necessary or inherent, at least with respect to gifts
made before the statute. For if, for instance, there were
an express condition or clause of reverter limiting the prop-
erty back to the donor in case the corporation should cease
to exist or to carry on the particular line of work to which
the gift was dedicated, then such donors could not be de-
prived of their express right of reverter by such a statute.
Whether in the absence of some such express provision in
the instrument of gift, the donors have such a right of re-
verter as is excepted from the operation of the statute, or as
they could not be deprived of, constitutionally, by such a
statute, may depend, in part at least, upon the terms on
which the particular gift was made.
